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The Rule of Capture's* ill effects on development of oil and gas are well known. Not only are
they well known, but they have in a sense passed into
history; every significant producing state has
adopted "conservation legislation" radically modifying the effect of the Rule. So it is not surprising
that the doctrine of prior appropriation -- a form
of capture principle -- has similar ill effects on
water development. My object here is to describe
those effects and explore some possible cures.
The Rule of Capture -- unmodified -- adversely
affects the development of oil and gas because it
gives each owner of a right to drill a skewed view
of the costs and benefits of drilling. Most
critically, for our purposes, it leads him to base
his decisions in part on phantom benefits.
Under the Rule of Capture an owner deciding
whether to drill a well counts all the oil or gas
that he expects the well to produce as a benefit
attributable to his drilling. But a portion of the

The essence of the Rule of Capture in the oil
and gas context is that a producer is not liable for
producing oil and gas originally in place under the
land of another so long as the producing well does
not trespass. Once the oil or gas is extracted, the
producer owns it in the more complete form of ownership generally associated with the ownership of a
chattel, i.e., it is no longer subject to legitimate
removal by another as was true when it was in the
ground.
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benefit is phantom: some of the oil* that he extracts
would have been produced by others' wells anyway. As
a result, owners in the aggregate will drill some
wells whose costs -- in terms of the value to society
of the resources invested in the well (steel, labor,
etc.) exceed the true benefits -- the value of the
oil that would not have been produced by other wells
anyway. If, for example, the present value of a
well's costs is $1 million, and the present value of
its true product (the oil it produces that would not
have been produced anyway) is $900,000, then the well
is, from a social standpoint, wasteful. Yet under
the Rule of Capture it would probably be drilled, if
it was expected to produce phantom benefits of
$100,000 or more. In an extreme case, such as the
East Texas field in the early 1930's, the result is
a forest of oil wells.
State conservation laws respond to this with
well-spacing regulations. These aim, in a very
rough way, at preventing the drilling of wells that
are not justified in terms of their real contribution
to aggregate mineral production from the field.
Again, a single owner under the Rule of Capture,
deciding on a rate of flow from his wells, counts
the full value of the well's product in any time

Used to refer to oil or gas.
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period as its gross benefit. But part of that value
is phantom: it simply duplicates the value of the
oil in the ground. The well owner perceives this
component of value at the wellhead as a benefit -as being attributable to his production costs -only because production is essential to his obtaining
a secure property right in the oil. The phantom
benefit drives the owners collectively to produce at
a faster rate than they would otherwise. It makes
them ready to incur more costs from accelerating
production -- such as channeling and other damage to
the reservoir -- than they would have been willing
to incur if their calculations were not skewed by
the phantom benefits. The result, in the extreme, is
suggested by the image of two boys with two straws
and only one soda. The soda is likely to disappear
very rapidly.
Conservation regulations seek to cure this by
setting allowables for each well, theoretically
representing a production ceiling roughly equivalent
to the efficient rate. (But see Stephen L. MacDonald,
Petroleum Conservation in the United States: An
Economic Analysis 150-196 (1971), for a critical
evaluation of the process by which spacing regulations and allowables are imposed.)
(Economists normally express these distorting
effects of the Rule of Capture in terms of external
H-3

costs rather than phantom benefits. Thus the detrimental effect of production from one owner's well
on production by other owners, and the detrimental
effects of his rapid rate of production, are costs
"external" to each owner's calculation of gains and
losses from alternative courses of conduct. I have
used the "phantom benefit" concept to convey the
same idea, because it seems an easier way to picture
the parallel distortions caused by the doctrine of
prior appropriation.)
The feature of the law of prior appropriation
that makes it a Rule of Capture is the principle
that, with a few special exceptions (for instream
uses such as recreation), acquisition of a property
right in water requires that it be (1) diverted from
the stream and (2) applied to a "beneficial use."
As a result someone anticipating a surge of future
demand, and higher prices for water rights, can
exploit that insight only by investing in expensive
diversion works. Suppose, for example, that an
observer of the water and energy scene believes that
by the year 2010 oil shale will again rise from the
ashes and be a source of demand for water. He has
before him a project with these characteristics:
Its cost, discounted to present value, is $5 million;
the present value of the returns from use of the
water, over the life of the project, is $4,500,000
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(all figures in constant 1982 dollars); and the
present value of the returns from the project between
scheduled completion in 1985 and the year 2010 is
$3,200,000. Finally, suppose the investor is confident that he will be able to sell the water rights
in the year 2010 for about $7.5 million (as always,
in constant 1982 dollars), which have a present worth
of about $2 million.* The expectation of that sale
will make the project appear to be a profitable one.
And this is true even though the purpose for which
the water is sold in the year 2010 is one that will
make no use whatever of the diversion works into
which our investor proposes to sink resources. In
tabular form:
(All figures in terms of present values)
1.

2.

Without the expected sale
Costs:

$5,000,000

Returns:

$4,500,000

With the expected sale in the year 2010
$5,000,000

Costs:
Returns:
From use of the
water, 1985-2010

$3,200,000

From sale of the
water in 2010

$2,000,000

Total returns:

$5,200,000

This (and the other figures) are based on an
assumed real interest rate of 5%. The principle is
of course not affected by the choice of interest rate.
H-5

The "benefit" that our investor anticipates in
the form of returns from sale in the year 2010 is
phantom. If it were not that the law says that he
cannot obtain a property right in the water without
making the diversion, there would be nothing that
causally linked that $2 million return to the investment.
Phantom though it be, the benefit is enough to
make the project look attractive to the investor.
He therefore will expend resources with a present
value of $5,000,000, even though the maximum real
return on that investment is only $4,500,000. And,
if the expected sale in the year 2010 actually goes
ahead, the diversion works will have generated only
the benefits attributable to use of the water from
1985 to 2010, or $3,200,000.
(We can reframe the analysis in terms of
external costs. The investor's diversion of the
water denies some other entity the opportunity to
sell the water in the year 2010, an opportunity that
on our facts has a present value of $2 million.
That cost is external to our investor's considerations. Of course the problem is that we cannot
identify the entity that is denied that opportunity:
until appropriation, the water is unowned.)
This analysis applies despite the fact that
H-6

many of the actors on the water development scene
are public entities that do not pursue "profit."
Even a public entity may rush forward with diversion
and transportation facilities in order to provide
supplies for the future, since, under current law,
that is the only way that it can obtain a secure
property right in those supplies. (Since the public
entity will usually not be looking forward to sale
of the resulting water right for some completely
different use, its diversion and transportation
facilities are more likely to be consistent with the
long-range use of the water. Even so, the rule
against anticipatory rights requires the public
entity to disguise its speculation by expending
resources on diversion and transportation sooner
than is necessary.) For example:
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(All figures are discounted to present value.)
1.

Conduct with the requirement of diversion and
application to a "beneficial use" (construction
to be completed in year 1985):
Costs:

$5,000,000

Benefits
From use of the water
1985-2000

$2,200,000

From use of the water
from the year 2000 on

3,000,000

Total Benefits:
2.

$5,200,000

Conduct without the requirement of diversion and
application to a "beneficial use" (construction
in year 2000):
Costs:

$2,405,000*

Benefits:

$3,000,000

The $3,000,000 in benefits from use of the water
after the year 2000, under the scenario where the
works are built in 1985, can be called quasi-phantom
benefits. They are not wholly phantom, because construction of the works at some time is essential to
the entity's enjoying them. But they are not due to
the entity's accelerating the construction to 1985.
Were it not for the entity's inability to secure a
property right in the water without making a diversion, it could have made those benefits available
but deferred construction until the year 2000. Instead, it incurred an additional $2,595,000 in the
Fresent value of construction costs, which produced
* This figure is the $5,000,000 cost, discounted
another 15 years because construction is deferred
by 15 years.
11-8

a real benefit of only $2,200,000.

The social waste takes the form of society's
expending resources with a present value of $5,000,000
to obtain what it could have obtained by an expenditure of resources with only a present value of
$2,405,000. The loss from this premature diversion
is a real one: society foregoes the product that
that capital could have furnished in the 15 years
from 1985 to 2000 if it had not been misapplied to
construction of facilities for water diversion and
transportation.
The essence of the cure for this problem would
be to allow people to acquire a right to water without putting it to any "beneficial use." Or, perhaps,
to preserve more of the existing nomenclature, one
might simply recognize "holding for future use" as
a form of beneficial use. A new form of water right
would thus come into existence, which I will call an
"anticipatory water right."
Besides removing the incentive for the sort of
wasteful expenditures described above, recognition of
such a right would create improved incentives for
current owners of appropriative rights to adopt
water-saving technology and practices. The primary
incentive for a right holder to invest money in
water-saving is the prospect of either applying the
saved water to some purpose of his own or selling
H-9

the resulting extra rights. But under present law,
even assuming a jurisdiction that has removed the
more arbitrary obstacles to sale of water rights
(see text at pages 2l-24 below), one who freed
up water by water-saving techniques could not hold
his legal right to the saved water unless he sold
it to someone then ready to embark upon applying it
to a beneficial use of the traditional sort. But
there may be few potential buyers ready to embark
on such immediate use. As a result, our prospective
water-saver may not be able to immediately realize
on the benefits from his water-saving. By increasing the number of potential current buyers, recognition of anticipatory rights will increase the
likelihood of his being able to cash in immediately
on the present value of those benefits.

The proposal of anticipatory rights raises a
series of practical problems and possible objections.
Some problems relate to (a) the initial allocation of
such anticipatory rights, others to (b) the effects
of such a change after initial allocation.
(a) Initial allocation. If such rights were
allocated without charge (as current-use rights are),
obviously the amount sought would vastly exceed the
available supply. Moreover, those to whom they
H-10

were allocated would enjoy a windfall. The solution
suggested by Meyers & Posner, and I think clearly
sound, is an auction of some sort (perhaps modelled
on government auctions for oil and gas leases).
(See Meyers & Posner, Market Transfers of Water
Rights: Toward an Improved Market in Water Resources
42-43 (National Water Commission Legal Study No. 4,
1971).) Presumably bidders would be willing to bid
roughly their estimate of the present discounted
value of the proceeds of sale of the water for the
uses which they anticipated.
This solution would give some concrete meaning
to the vague proposition, so much a part of current
water law, that the unappropriated waters of the
state belong to the people. It would enable the
people to realize on that "ownership" -- now a matter
of rhetoric -- in the form of the receipts which
would flow into the state treasury from the auction.
Not only does an auction solve the twin goals of
(a) avoiding windfalls and (b) equating supply with
demand, but it averts the problems that arise when
government allocates rights on a basis of attempted
application of merit principles. The model of such
attempted application of merit principles is the FCC,
which allocates valuable radio and TV channels on the
basis of its appraisal of the extent to which
applicants will serve the "public interest." The
-11

result is that applicants invest enormous resources
in hiring high-priced lawyers to put on a largely
meaningless show: meaningless because the criteria
for the public interest are necessarily so elusive.
In addition, there is (I read) occasional hankypanky: political affiliations of the applicants
have been known to play a role, and money has even
been known to pass under the table. Identifying the
"public interest" in connection with anticipatory
water rights would be no easier. No one's crystal
ball is perfect. Rather than have some public
officials try to identify the anticipated project of
the greatest public value, an auction would decentralize and objectify that process. Bidders would
base their maximum bids on their appraisal of the
returns from their expected future sales. A bidder
who wins through excessive optimism will bear the
loss. Moreover, his decision on actual water use
will be made in the light of facts as they develop.
If the originally anticipated uses do not pan out,
owners of anticipatory rights will switch to alternatives or sell to others who will do so. The rights
should, of course, not be defined in terms of a
specific use.
The above assumes that if the ultimate allocation of the water maximizes the return to the holder
of the anticipatory rights, it will necessarily be
H-12

in the public interest. As Dr. Kneese's talk has
shown, this overlooks the fact that uses will vary

sharply in the extent to which they generate external costs or benefits -- i.e.,
_ _ costs or benefits
external to the calculation of the owner. But that
problem is completely independent of the ownership
of anticipatory rights. If it is appropriate for
government to constrain actual water uses in the
light of those externalities -- whether by prohibiting
or taxing disfavored uses, or by subsidizing favored
ones -- government may do so whether or not people are
able to hold anticipatory rights.
(b) Effects of ownership of anticipatory rights.
I think the primary objection here will be a fear of
"speculation" and "hoarding." "Exxon will grab up
all the rights." "Money means nothing to Exxon."
The fear deserves a very close look.
The first answer is that some of the behavior
that people label "speculation" is very useful to
society. For example, if the water rights involved
in my first hypo are held by a "speculator," who
refuses to sell them for any price less than the
present value of the expected future sales price, his
doing so prevents the investor depicted there from
investing $5 million of real resources in a project
whose true return, in terms of the value of its
benefits to society, would only have been $3.2
H-13

million.
Just as speculation in commodities mitigates
the effect of unusual scarcity -- for example, by

holding back some of the supplies of this year's
coffee crop for use next year, when it is learned
that next year's crop will be a bust -- so
"speculation" in anticipatory water rights prevents
a social loss.
The benefits of "speculation" in water rights
are curious, however. Unlike the coffee speculator,
the holder of anticipatory rights does not preserve
for the future a supply that would otherwise not be
there. The fact of someone's holding water rights
in anticipation of use in 2010 does not increase
the amount of water that will be physically available
in the year 2010. The function of the holder of
unused rights is negative: he prevents the waste
of resources that would occur if diversion and
current use were the only ways in which someone
could cash in on the expectation of valuable future
uses.
In other words, the rule against anticipatory
water rights is in fact not an effective rule against
speculation. "Instead it creates an incentive for
the speculator to disguise his speculative intentions
by constructing economically unjustified irrigation
works or otherwise conducting an uneconomical
H-14

operation involving the actual use of water." Meyers
& Posner at 41. In turn, the benefit from allowing
"speculation" in the form of ownership of anticipatory water rights is precisely to avoid the social
waste involved in those "economically unjustified
irrigation works" [new diversions made in order to
obtain a new water right for speculative purposes]
or "uneconomical operation[s] involving the actual
use of water" [persistence in wasteful water uses in
order to retain a large water right for speculative
purposes].
Second, there is nothing about anticipatory
water rights that would prevent other uses in the
interim. Suppose X is holding anticipatory water
rights based on his expectation of an application to
oil shale in the year 2010. Y comes along with a
project that could use the water from 1982 through
2009, and the benefits from use in that period exceed
the costs of the project. Clearly this creates an
opportunity for a mutually favorable transaction
between X and Y. And, assuming that there are many
Xs and Ys (that is, many people holding anticipatory
water rights and many people interested in renting
them for the immediate or short-term), there would be
a lively and competitive market for such rentals.
Renters of such rights would have a "cost" of
a sort that is absent under present arrangements,
H-15

but it is a real cost, and in a competitive market
would presumably be no more than what was economically
sound: the value of the most valuable alternative
use that was precluded by the actual renter's use of
the water for his rental period. No renter should
get the water unless his project is sufficiently
valuable to enable him to pay such a rental.
(Even in the case where there was only one
holder of anticipatory rights, he would still want
to maximize his returns by making rentals. It is
conceivable that such a monopoly position would cause
less than all the anticipatory rights to be leased,
even though they would have been in a competitive
market. The suitable answer would seem to be a
prohibition on any one entity's holding an excessive
fraction of the total anticipatory rights outstanding.)
Third, the image of "hoarding" raises some
additional problems. One is the risk of monopoly
and the other is that the risk that holders of anticipatory rights would obstruct the allocation of
water to valuable current uses.
The possibility of monopoly is certainly real.
As I suggested above, any monopolistic control of
anticipatory rights might obstruct socially advantageous leases of water rights; it might also interfere with sales of anticipatory rights to persons
proposing to make longterm, or indefinite-term, uses
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of the water. (If demand for water were very inelastic, a monopolist might profit by selling off
less than the quantity of anticipatory rights than
would be sold off in a competitive market.)
But there are possible solutions to the threat
of monopolization. The statute enabling creation
of anticipatory rights would provide that no single
entity could hold more than some specific per
cent, say 3% or 5% or 10%, of the anticipatory
rights. The prohibition would have to operate so as
to avoid evasion by the use of affiliates. Further,
because water transportation costs are high, markets
are to some degree local; therefore it might be wise
to place some additional ceiling on the fraction of
anticipatory rights held by any one entity in each
watershed.
The other possible obstruction of timely sales
by the owner of anticipatory rights is the risk of
high transaction costs.
To see their potential role, we may look at the
way a properly functioning market prevents a
speculator from holding onto his speculation for
longer than is in the public interest. What prevents an owner of undeveloped land from refusing to
allow its development after the time for development
is ripe? In a well-functioning market, when people
with ideas for alternative uses can readily make
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bids for undeveloped land, the owner who persists in
holding it undeveloped incurs opportunity costs. He
must forego the money offered by bidders, and as a
consequence the income that he could earn by
investing that money. A speculator in coffee (or
any other commodity) incurs similar opportunity
costs: if he fails to sell a bag of coffee today, he
must forego the income that he could enjoy from the
proceeds he would receive if he did sell. The holder
of a bag of coffee is constantly trading off the
present value of the return from a future sale against
the present value of a current one. If the price
bid by current consumers rose above the present
value of the proceeds of future sale, some holders
would sell off. (This would bring the price relationships back into equilibrium, so that the present
value of a future sale just equalled the current
price.)
In a properly functioning water market, the
same would be true of anticipatory water rights.
Suppose, for example, that X has acquired water
rights in anticipation of sale for oil shale purposes in the year 2010, at a price that he calculates
will yield returns with a present value of $2 million.
Along comes Y, with a current project, costing $5
million and with returns over the project life
having a present value of $8 million. (Let us
H-18

assume for simplicity's sake that the project life
encompasses a period long enough to be completely
inconsistent with its use for X's expected oil shale
activities.) Y would be willing and presumably able
to bid X's rights away from him. At any price below
$3 million, Y still stands to gain, and at any price
above $2 million X stands to gain. Indeed, anytime
that someone comes up with a project inconsistent
with X's plans, but in which the water would have a
higher net value than X anticipates from his original
plan, the two should strike a deal.
But high transaction costs might buffer an owner
of anticipatory water rights from feeling the full
brunt of these opportunity costs. For the opportunity costs to bite, the owner must be more or less
continually exposed to opportunities to sell, at
prices at (or close to) the true market value of his
rights. If high transaction costs cause bids to
be rare, and to come in at less than the true market
value of his rights, then there will not be enough
bids, or the bids will not be high enough, to impose
adequate opportunity costs on the owner. And in the
realm of water transfers, transaction costs are
notoriously high.
Nonetheless, if we look at each of the factors
tending to raise transaction costs for water
transfers, the picture is not so bleak. Those
11-19

factors seem to me to fall into three classes:
(1) ones that simply would not apply to sales of
anticipatory rights; (2) ones that might apply, but
which any legislature recognizing anticipatory
rights would necessarily want to correct; and (3)
ones which would remain in the absence of some
innovation. I will deal with them in that order.
(1) Transaction costs inherently inapplicable
to sales of anticipatory rights. A major source of
high transaction costs for conventional water rights
transfers is the need to protect junior appropriators
dependent upon return flow from the water in the area
of its original use. The relevant transaction costs
include the costs of gathering evidence as to historical use and hydrologic evidence as to the portion
of the withdrawal right that returned to the stream.
They also include the legal proceedings necessary to
work out adequate protection for the juniors who
woud be adversely affected by the transfer. (The
reduction in the right resulting from concessions
needed to protect those juniors is not here treated
as a transaction cost, for it is necessary to
compensate resource owners for real losses that the
transfer would otherwise impose.)
But no such evidence-gathering or legal proceedings would be necessary in connection with the
transfer of anticipatory rights, for there would be
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no juniors with any legal right to "return flow."
To the extent that there were junior appropriative
rights in use, they would necessarily be subordinate
to the right of the owner of anticipatory rights to
withdraw the entire amount of his paper right. (If
the anticipatory owner were only entitled to withdraw
the portion of his right which was consumptive, that
would of course be 0%, and his right would be utterly
worthless.)
(2) Transaction costs qualifiedly inapplicable
to sales of anticipatory rights: ones which a
legislature recognizing anticipatory rights would
want to abolish. Conventional water rights transfers
are impeded by various statutes, administrative rules,
and administrative attitudes. In some states, for
example, statutes virtually prohibit such transfers.
See Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec. 46-122 (1974 Reissue); Nev.
Rev. Stat. 533.040 and 533.325 (1960); Okla. Stat.
Title 82, § 105.22 (1981 Supp.); S.D. Cod. Laws
§§ 46-5-33 to 46-5-35 (1978 Rev.); cf. Wyo. Stat.
§ 41-3-104 (1974 ed.) (authorizing transfer conditioned
on a bureaucratic permit at least potentially entailing very complex findings), and Comment, Changing
Manner and Place of Use of Water Rights in Wyoming,
10 Land & Water L. Rev. 455 (1975). The prohibitory
laws appear to have originated in a desire to prevent
owners of paper water rights, far in excess of the
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needs of the parcel to which they were originally
applied, from enjoying a windfall through sale of
the excess. Quite apart from the cogent reasons to
repeal such statutes generally, see Meyers & Posner
at 25-27, the reason for their adoption is inapplicable in the case of anticipatory rights acquired by
bidding at an auction. (An administrative approval
scheme of the sort exemplified by Wyoming presents
a mixed case. A legislature would want to trade off
(a) the advantages of the permit process in terms of
being able to guide private choices as to water use
in the light of external costs and benefits, against
(b) the benefits of facilitating conversion of
anticipatory rights to use rights by keeping transaction costs low.)
In some states there is at least legal doubt as
to the power of water districts to sell off water
rights. See, e.g., a California Attorney General's
Opinion saying that a water conservation district
held its water in trust to receive and distribute
water to landowners within the district, so that it
could not sell surface recreational water rights to
a land developer (51 Cal. Ops. Atty. Gen. 153, No.
68-102, 1968); and see Cal. Water Code § 22261
("Nothing in this article [referring to Water Code
§§ 22250-64] authorizes the sale of any water right"
[by an irrigation district]); and see generally
Meyers & Posner at Appendix 1. It would be inherent
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in any legislative decision to recognize anticipatory
rights to permit any holder of such rights to transfer them, for such power to transfer would be
essential if anticipatory rights were to be effective
in removing incentives to speculative investment in
diversion works.
At least in California, a state agency monitoring use of appropriation rights, the State Water
Resources Control Board, has taken the view that any
holder's effort to transfer a water right in one
year demonstrates that he is not applying the water
to a "beneficial use" and is therefore not entitled
to it thereafter. See S. Angelides and E. Bardach,
Water Banking: How to Stop Wasting Agricultural
Water 10-11 (Institute for Contemporary Studies 1978).
Again, it is inherent in recognizing the usefulness
of anticipatory rights that the rights would not
lapse as soon as the owner attempted to transfer
them.
Basically, these restrictions on transfers, or
clouds upon the legality of transfer, tend to arise
out of attitudes that are inconsistent with recognition of anticipatory rights. While those
attitudes might constitute a formidable obstacle
to recognition of such rights, any legislature that
was persuaded of the advantage of recognizing anticipatory rights would almost surely be ready to
H-23

eradicate these restrictions or clouds.
(3) Transaction costs that are as applicable
to conversion of anticipatory rights as to change in

use of conventional rights. A serious obstacle to
changes in the use of conventional water rights is
that, although the transferring parties must protect
juniors who would be adversely affected by the
change, they are often given no rights in their
return flow at the new location. Thus they confer
an uncompensated benefit on water users downstream
of the point to which transfer is made.

Their

inability to capture the value of that benefit,
coupled with their duty to protect adversely affected
juniors, amounts to a tax on transfers. (Where
the transfer is to an entirely new stream, the
transferee may be able to retain a property right
in the return flow from the new use. See City &
County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 506
P.2d 144 (Colo. 1972); and see Williams, Optimizing
Water Use: The Return Flow Issue, 44 Colo. L. Rev.
301, 311-321 (1973). This is a helpful but incomplete exception to the general rule.)
As applied to the conversion of anticipatory
rights to use rights, the impact of this rule is to
aritificially load the dice as between types of uses
to which the water may be devoted. Suppose, for
example, there are two potential users of water,
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one having a use that is 100% consumptive (zero
return flow to the stream) and another a use that is
10% consumptive (90% of the water originally applied
returns to the stream). The 10% consumptive use
obviously imposes a far smaller burden on the total
water system, yet its developers will presumably
have to pay the same (per unit of water to be
originally withdrawn) as the bidder with a 100% consumptive use, with no possibility of recapturing the
value of the 90% of the water which he returns to the
stream. The most attractive remedy would be to give
hime the right to resell or reuse such return flow.
See discussion at Meyers & Posner 29-31.
Even if we assume that this transaction cost is
not removed by suitable legislation or judicial
decision, however, it does not seem a powerful basis
for objecting to recognition of anticipatory rights.
Its major effect is to create distortions in the
economic feasibility of particular uses of water -precisely the same as the distortions that apply as
between different uses competing for unowned water
under the current system. (In comparing costs with
benefits, the person proposing to divert water and
apply it to a 10% consumptive use is forced to
disregard the benefits generated by the 90% which
returns to the stream.)
In summary: high transaction costs in the
H-25

transfer of anticipatory rights, or their conversion
into use rights, would carry a risk of unduly
delaying water development. Such transaction costs
would tend to shelter owners of anticipatory rights
from the opportunity costs of hanging on to their
rights too long. But when we examine the sources
of high transaction costs for conventional water
transfers, we find that some are simply inapplicable
to the transfer or conversion of an anticipatory
right, some are ones that any legislature ready to
recognize anticipatory rights would surely want to
remove, and some create no more problem for the conversion of anticipatory rights than they do for the
conversion of unowned, unappropriated water under
present law.

III
Up to this point,

I have considered the recog-

nition of anticipatory rights largely in terms of
avoiding the economic waste that occurs when speculators in water rights must disguise their speculation
by making an actual diversion. But there is another
dimension to the recognition of anticipatory rights:
it may present an opportunity to defuse some of the
intense political conflict over interbasin transfers.
Market systems have a tendency to defuse political
conflict, largely because anyone who gets a
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resource must pay the prior owner a price that
satisfies that owner. (For a general consideration
of the point, see Dwight R. Lee, The Political
Economy of Social Conflict, or Malice in Plunderland
(International Institute for Economic Research, Orig.
Paper 36, 1982).) Thus the shipment of several
hundred billions worth of oil out of Texas has not
much alarmed the Texans, while the transfer of a few
million dollars worth of Oregon water to Southern
California could fairly be expected to generate
violent political conflict. It seems likely that a
key distinction lies in the fact that the Texas oil
was owned by people and corporations who sold the
oil only at prices that they considered acceptable.
(Even in the era of price controls and windfall
profit taxes, the point is largely true.) Might not
ownership of anticipatory rights have a similar
effect on interregional conflict over water? I
think that there is some potential for that effect,
but want to explore with you some of the problems.
Until now we have assumed that the anticipatory
water rights would arise primarily by auction by the
state. (The other source previously considered is
the conversion of existing use rights into anticipatory rights when the holders of the use right adopted
water-saving practices.) We have also assumed an
anti-monopoly rule of some sort. The result would
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presumably be widely scattered holding of the rights.
Local and regional agencies might be among the
owners, but presumably none would own a significant
share because of the anti-monopoly rule. The
auction proceeds would have flowed into the state
treasury.
Would this do much to reconcile a lightly
developed area to the export of its water? To be
more precise, would the flow of funds to the owners
of anticipatory water rights in a particular basin
defuse the political resistance of citizens in that
basin? To the extent that owners of the local water
were local individuals or local agencies, it would
have that tendency. But we have no reason to think
that these would predominate. To return to my Texan
example, notice that local people tended to receive a
significant share of the proceeds of oil sales, since
the owner of the overlying land was very likely to
be entitled to royalty on the extraction. But we
have no assurance that, for example, the lion's share
of Colorado Western Slope anticipatory rights might
not be held by shrewd investors in New York, Chicago
and Los Angeles.
A partial remedy would be to allocate the auction
proceeds to the area of origin. And I can think of
no objection to doing so. I question, however,
whether it would fully defuse the political conflict.
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While the auction proceeds would presumably approximate the present value of the water, the discount
to present value might make those proceeds look
small compared to the region's image of the future
value. Moreover, the proceeds would not capture
significant pecuniary "spillover" benefits -increases in land value and employment and entrepreneurial opportunities that would accrue to a
region retaining the water locally and building an
economy on its use. My impression is that the
mystique of water is such that residents of any
such export region are likely to have a very optimistic view of those spillover benefits.
An additional way to help defuse the political
conflict would be to relax the anti-monopoly rules in
favor of ownership by regional entities of a political or semi-political nature. These would certainly
include, for example, irrigation districts, and
might include general purpose municipal governmental
entities such as counties or cities. With the
proceeds of ultimate sale of the anticipatory rights
certain to flow to the area of origin itself, the
political pressure for statutes protecting the area
of origin, see, e.2., Cal. Water Code SS 10505 &
11460 (West 1956), should abate to some degree.
Cf. National Water Commission, Water Policies for
the Future 327-333 and Recommendation 8-3.b. (1973);
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Angelides and Bardach at 32.
It might be possible to enable some such entities to acquire the rights initially without out-ofpocket costs, by allocating to the purchasing entity
the auction proceeds for the particular rights sold.
Thus the entity would bid for the rights with the
very money that it would receive as a distribution
from the auction.
But such a change introduces problems of its
own. To the extent that local political or semipolitical entities hold the rights, the assurance
that rights-holders will respond to economic incentives will be reduced. For example, a political
or semi-political owner seems more likely than a
private owner to form an unrealistically high idea
of the value of the rights that it holds. Further,
although the press is diligent in smoking out
certain forms of "waste" by public officials,
opportunity costs -- the foregoing of returns from
a potential sale -- have a subtlety about them that
seems to cause the press to neglect them completely.
As a consequence of these factors, public entities
would be more likely than private ones to reject
bids by developers with projects that are in fact
far more economically valuable than the uses to
which the entity might ultimately allocate the
rights.
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One way to offset this effect might be to try
to give the political constituency of the entity (of
whatever kind) some immediate interest in the proceeds of any sale that the entity might make of
anticipatory rights that it acquired. For example,
if the owning entity were required to distribute the
proceeds of any sale to its constituents -- perhaps
in the form of property tax rebates -- then the
constituents would put pressure on the politicians
to give a serious consideration to realistic bids
for uses outside the region.
Whatever the solution, the goal of depoliticizing
conflict over water transfers is likely to require
some compromise of the pure efficiency purposes
of recognizing anticipatory rights.

Conclusion
Present appropriation law generates wasteful
expenditure of resources because it forces people
(individuals, private corporations, and public
corporations) who anticipate rising demand and
rising market value for water rights to invest in
wasteful facilities in order to secure rights to
future use of water; it forces the speculator to
disguise his speculation, and the disguise takes
the form of diversion works that are premature
and/or unnecessary. Recognition of anticipatory
H-31

rights in water would remove the incentive for such
wasteful expenditures.
Recognition of anticipatory rights should not
foreclose any economically sound water development
project. Anti-monopoly rules should preserve a
competitive market both for lease and for sale of
the rights in fee simple. Because the most severe
sources of high transaction costs for ordinary
changes of a water right are either inapplicable to
conversions from anticipatory status, or would be
easily removed by a legislature authorizing recognition of such rights, holders of the rights would
be kept under substantial pecuniary incentives not
to hold onto the rights too long but to allow their
application to active use at a suitable time.
Finally, recognition of anticipatory rights
holds out some prospect of helping to defuse the
political tension emerging from consideration of
inter-regional water transfers. By helping to
provide a mechanism for compensation of citizens in
the basin of origin, anticipatory rights can change
the bargaining over such transfers; instead of
political wrestling, with the losing region
defeated by the winning region (typically the more
populous), the bargaining can become a process of
mutually advantageous exchange. But achievement
of this latter goal may partly frustrate the goal
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of attaining full economic rationality in the allocation and development of water resources.
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